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Abstract 
 
My aim in this paper is to reassess the conceptual–procedural distinction as drawn in 
relevance theory in the light of almost thirty years of research. In section 1, I make some 
comparisons between approaches to semantics based on a conceptual–procedural 
distinction and those based on a distinction between truth conditions and conditions for 
appropriate use. In section 2, I present a brief history of the conceptual–procedural 
distinction as drawn in relevance theory. In section 3, I consider the nature of procedural 
encoding and discuss whether it is best seen as semantic or pragmatic. In section 4, I 
outline some parallels and differences between procedural and use-conditional accounts 
of interjections. In section 5, I discuss the implications of the conceptual–procedural 
distinction for lexical pragmatics and consider some recent proposals about how it might 
be extended. In section 6, I reassess the conceptual–procedural distinction in the light of 
current evolutionary approaches to cognition and point out some future directions for 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
Diane Blakemore began her book Semantic Constraints on Relevance (1987) by arguing that 
Gazdar’s famous slogan “Pragmatics = Meaning minus Truth Conditions” (Gazdar, 1979:2) 
lays an inadequate foundation for a cognitively plausible pragmatic theory. Her main concern 
was a class of inferential connectives such as but, so and moreover which are widely seen as 
non-truth-conditional: she argued that these should fall within the scope of linguistic 
semantics rather than pragmatics, since their meanings are linguistically encoded rather than 
pragmatically inferred. Blakemore’s analyses of these connectives differed substantially from 
those traditionally offered for regular ‘content’ words like scarlet, hop and giraffe. Rather 
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than encoding concepts, constituents of a conceptual representation system or ‘language of 
thought’, she argued that the information they encode is essentially procedural: they indicate 
the inferential processes addressees are expected to use in identifying the speaker’s meaning 
(i.e. the array of propositions that the speaker overtly intended to make manifest or more 
manifest, cf. Sperber and Wilson, 2015). In her view, the differences between these 
connectives and regular ‘content’ words are enough to suggest a “non-unitary theory of 
linguistic semantics”: 
 
On the one hand, there is the essentially conceptual theory that deals with the way in 
which elements of linguistic structure map onto concepts – that is, onto constituents of 
propositional representations that undergo computations. On the other, there is the 
essentially procedural theory that deals with the way in which elements of linguistic 
structure map directly onto computations themselves – that is, onto mental processes. 
(Blakemore, 1987:144) 
 
Blakemore’s procedural approach has since been extended to a variety of further expressions 
which present problems for the traditional view that the meaning of a word is the concept it 
encodes, including indexicals, mood indicators, discourse particles, interjections and 
pejoratives, and its implications are still being explored.
1
  
 
Blakemore’s concerns in Semantic Constraints on Relevance were explicitly cognitive: her 
aim was to contribute to a “psychologically plausible account of the role of context in 
utterance interpretation” (Blakemore, 1987:1). On the formal side, researchers in a tradition 
inspired by David Kaplan (1989, 1999) also reject Gazdar’s slogan and draw the borderline 
between linguistic semantics and pragmatics in a similar way to Blakemore’s (e.g. Potts, 
2005, 2007; Gutzmann, 2015). Kaplan (2004:3) describes his reasons for moving beyond the 
traditional concerns of truth-conditional semantics in the following terms: 
 
I began to see the semantics of indexicals as having greater affinities with the semantics 
(or potential semantics) of epithets, diminutives, interjections, nicknames, ethnic slur 
terms, and the like, than with the paradigms of meaningfulness, things like fortnight and 
feral and so on. 
 
However, where Blakemore analyses these expressions in procedural terms and sees them as 
evidence for a “non-unitary theory of semantics”, Kaplan analyses them in terms of felicity 
conditions, or conditions for their appropriate use, and aims to provide a unitary account of 
what he calls a “Semantics of Meaning” and a “Semantics of Use”: 2 
 
I now believe that by attending to rules of use – the right sort of rules of use – we can 
extend our formal semantics, and thus even our logic, to systematically account for the 
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ignored semantic phenomena, and with surprising and, I hope, illuminating results. 
(Kaplan, 2004:3) 
 
As far as I know, despite the obvious overlaps in the range of data they are dealing with, there 
have been no attempts to compare the two approaches in any systematic way.
3
 This is partly 
because of a difference in their priorities. Use theorists generally approach the data from the 
direction of formal semantics and are primarily concerned with issues of truth and validity, 
whereas procedural semanticists (typically relevance theorists) generally have a background 
in pragmatics and are primarily concerned with how language provides inputs to a 
cognitively plausible comprehension mechanism. Researchers in both frameworks have 
produced a wealth of subtle observations, but have also encountered a variety of problems 
that are still awaiting solutions. This raises the question of how they might benefit from each 
other’s results. Are the two frameworks compatible? Are some data best analysed in 
procedural terms and others in use-conditional terms? Can procedural analyses be 
straightforwardly translated into use-conditional analyses and vice versa? To the extent that 
the two frameworks are compatible and their results are inter-translatable, this raises the 
further question of whether they are genuinely distinct.  
 
I think these questions are worth raising, and although I will not offer any systematic 
answers, I will comment on them where possible along the way. However, my main aim in 
this paper is to reassess the conceptual–procedural distinction as it has been drawn in 
relevance theory in the light of almost thirty years of research, considering some common 
objections and problems and speculating on how it might be extended in future work.
4
 The 
paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I look briefly at how the conceptual–procedural 
distinction was introduced into relevance theory. In section 3, I discuss the nature of 
procedural encoding. In section 4, I consider some parallels and differences between 
procedural and use-conditional accounts of interjections. In section 5, I discuss the 
implications of the conceptual–procedural distinction for lexical pragmatics and reflect on 
some recent speculative proposals about how it might be extended. In section 6, I discuss the 
relation between the conceptual–procedural distinction and current evolutionary approaches 
to cognition such as the ‘massive modularity’ hypothesis. Section 7 is a brief conclusion. 
 
2. The conceptual–procedural distinction in relevance theory 
At the heart of Diane Blakemore’s procedural approach to semantics is the idea that in a 
pragmatic framework such as relevance theory, where utterance comprehension involves not 
only identifying the proposition expressed but exploring the cognitive effects achieved by 
processing it in the context of an appropriately selected set of assumptions, it would be useful 
to have some linguistic devices whose function is to constrain the inferential comprehension 
process and guide the hearer towards the appropriate contextual assumptions and cognitive 
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addressing different issues and examples where possible in order to keep any overlap to a minimum. 
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effects. Blakemore’s proposal was to treat inferential connectives such as but, so and 
moreover as devices of this type: 
 
The goal of this study is to show that the meanings of those expressions that do not play 
a role in determining the proposition expressed by the utterances that contain them 
should be analysed in terms of constraints on the inferential computations the hearer 
performs in order to establish the impact of that proposition – or, in other words, its 
relevance. (Blakemore, 1987:18) 
 
In this framework, non-truth-conditional connectives are seen as procedural in the sense that 
they encode “instructions” to the hearer on how to find the intended relevance of the 
proposition expressed. Approaches of this type can be traced back to Frege (1892/1993:38), 
who saw but and still as devices for “aiding the hearer’s understanding” without affecting the 
propositional content or thought expressed.
5
  
 
To illustrate, consider (1a)–(1c): 
 
(1) a. Lisa is French, so she doesn’t need a passport to travel to Germany. 
 b. Joe’s argument is unoriginal. Moreover, it’s invalid. 
 c. The sun is shining, but there are clouds on the horizon. 
 
In (1a), the inferential use of so can be analysed as indicating that the proposition that Lisa 
doesn’t need a passport to travel to Germany is a conclusion derivable from the proposition 
that she is French (together with background assumptions) (Blakemore, 1987:85-90). In (1b), 
the inferential use of moreover can be analysed as indicating that the propositions expressed 
by the preceding and following clauses provide evidence for a common conclusion in a 
context available to the addressee (Blakemore, 1987:91-97); and in (1c), the ‘denial of 
expectation’ use of but can be analysed as indicating that the proposition expressed by the 
following clause should be understood as inhibiting a conclusion potentially derivable from 
the first clause (Blakemore, 1987:125-41; Hall, 2007). This procedural approach has been 
used to analyse a wide variety of inferential connectives in different languages (e.g. Blass, 
1990; Gutt, 1991; Unger, 2011). 
 
Blakemore’s initial analyses suggested that the conceptual–procedural distinction coincides 
with the distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning (where 
truth-conditional meaning contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance, and hence 
to its speech-act content, and non-truth-conditional meaning constrains the inferential phase 
of comprehension). In a second phase of research, it became clear that the two distinctions 
cross-cut each other in several ways. For instance, Wilson and Sperber (1993) argued that (a) 
not all conceptual expressions are truth-conditional, (b) not all procedural expressions are 
                                                 
5
 Horn (2007) draws interesting parallels between Frege’s insights and current approaches to 
pragmatics. 
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non-truth-conditional, and (c) not all procedural expressions impose constraints on the 
construction of contexts and cognitive effects.  
 
As evidence that not all non-truth-conditional expressions are procedural, consider the 
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials frankly and unfortunately. These are generally treated 
as non-truth-conditional on the ground that they modify the illocutionary force of an 
utterance rather than contributing to the content of the speech act performed. Thus, the 
speaker of (2) is naturally understood as asserting that Joe’s argument is incoherent, and 
indicating by the use of the illocutionary adverbial that she is speaking frankly: 
 
(2) Frankly, Joe’s argument is incoherent.  
 
However, rather than treating frankly in (2) as procedural because of its non-truth-conditional 
nature, Wilson and Sperber (1993) note that it has a synonymous manner-adverbial 
counterpart which is a regular ‘content’ word and contributes to truth conditional content in 
the regular way, as in (3):  
 
(3) Sue told Joe frankly that his argument was incoherent. 
 
They propose that both uses of frankly are best seen as encoding concepts, which (in different 
environments) can contribute either to the proposition expressed by the utterance or to its so-
called ‘higher-order explicatures’, which carry information about the speaker’s propositional 
or affective attitude or the type of speech act she intends to perform.
6
 On this approach, the 
speaker of (2) would communicate a basic-level explicature that Joe’s argument is incoherent 
and a higher-order explicature that she is being frank in telling him so. The truth conditions 
of the assertion would depend on the basic explicature, while the higher-order explicature 
would make no difference to the truth-conditional content of the utterance (although it would 
have truth conditions of its own). Thus, frankly in (2) is both conceptual and non-truth-
conditional. 
 
The pronouns we and you, or the demonstratives this and that, illustrate a second way in 
which the conceptual–procedural distinction and the truth-conditional/ non-truth-conditional 
distinction come apart. Pronouns and demonstratives are not plausibly analysed as encoding 
full concepts, since their referents vary from context to context and have to be pragmatically 
inferred. However, they do contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances, since 
they affect the pragmatic process of reference resolution. Wilson and Sperber (1993) propose 
to treat them as encoding procedural constraints on the proposition expressed by the utterance 
rather than the intended context and cognitive effects. On this approach, use of the pronoun 
we in (4) would restrict the search space for reference resolution to sets consisting of the 
speaker and some other individual(s): 
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 On higher-order explicatures, see Sperber and Wilson (1986/995:243-254; 1988); Ifantidou (2001); 
Wilson (2000); Carston (2002); Jodlowiec (2015). 
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(4) We wrote the paper. 
 
Thus, we in (4) is both procedural and truth-conditional (see e.g. Powell, 2010; Scott, 2011, 
2013, this issue).  
 
Finally, a variety of non-truth-conditional items such as mood indicators, sentence and 
discourse particles, interjections and prosody have been analysed as encoding a still further 
type of procedural constraint, this time on the construction of higher-order explicatures. For 
instance, the addition of an interrogative particle, question intonation or interrogative word 
order to the utterance in (5) might encourage construction of the higher-order explicature in 
(6a); use of the interjection phew! or certain types of affective intonation with (5) might 
encourage construction of the higher-order explicature in (6b); and addition of a warning tone 
of voice might encourage construction of the higher-order explicature in (6c) (see e.g. Wilson 
and Sperber, 1993); Escandell-Vidal, 2002; Jary, 2011): 
 
(5) Lisa is going on holiday. 
(6) a.  The speaker is wondering whether Lisa is going on holiday. 
 b. The speaker is expressing relief that Lisa is going on holiday. 
 c. The speaker is warning the addressee that Lisa is going on holiday. 
 
I will discuss some of these analyses in later sections. 
 
While there is broad agreement among use-conditional theorists and procedural theorists on 
which constructions call for a new approach to semantics, there is less consensus on two 
types of case: appositive relatives and parentheticals, on the one hand, and connectives such 
as but and so, on the other. Relevance theorists treat parentheticals and appositives as both 
conceptual and truth-conditional – conceptual for parallel reasons to those given above for 
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, and truth-conditional on the ground that their falsity 
leads to falsity of the utterance as a whole (Blakemore, 1993; Ifantidou, 2001). Some use 
theorists, by contrast, treat them as non-truth-conditional and analyse them as carrying 
Gricean conventional implicatures (e.g. Potts, 2005). However, as Horn (2007:52) points out, 
the fact that appositives and parentheticals may contain overt performatives, as in (7), is 
incompatible with the view that their content is merely implicated, and confirms their truth-
conditional status. 
 
(7) This administration’s policy on Iraq, which I hereby endorse, is morally bankrupt. 
 
There has also been some debate about the non-truth-conditional status of connectives such 
as but and so. For instance, Bach (1999) argues that P but Q expresses the proposition that P 
contrasts with Q, which in his view contributes to the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance although it is often not salient enough to affect truth-value judgements. Hall (2007) 
discusses several problems with this proposal. Consider (8), for instance: 
 
(8) It’s raining but the ground is wet. 
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As Hall points out, the contribution of but should be highly salient here, yet in a situation 
where it is raining and the ground is indeed wet, (8) would be judged true (though 
infelicitous) despite the lack of any contrast. Further evidence for the non-truth-conditional 
status of but comes from standard embedding tests. Consider (9a)–(9b): 
 
(9) a. If the sun is shining but there are clouds on the horizon, you should cancel 
your picnic. 
 b. If the sun is shining and there are clouds on the horizon, you should cancel 
your picnic. 
 
In both utterances, the speaker is naturally understood as encouraging the addressee to cancel 
the picnic on the following two conditions: (a) the sun is shining, and (b) there are clouds on 
the horizon. The fact (if it is a fact) that these conditions are in contrast, or that (b) is 
unexpected in the light of (a), does not affect the truth conditions of either (9a) or (9b). This 
suggests that the additional information carried by but is purely non-truth-conditional. 
Parallel arguments apply to moreover in (10a) as compared with its absence in (10b): 
 
(10)  a. If Joe’s argument is unoriginal and moreover it’s invalid, you should reject his 
paper. 
 b. If Joe’s argument is unoriginal and invalid, you should reject his paper. 
 
The fact that (10a) and (10b) are true and false together strongly suggests that the information 
carried by moreover is non-truth-conditional. 
 
The case of connectives such as so and therefore is more complex, since they sometimes 
seem to be truth-conditional and sometimes not. Grice (1989:120-121) famously saw so and 
therefore as non-truth-conditional and analysed them as carrying conventional implicatures. 
In some cases, their non-truth-conditional status appears to be confirmed by standard 
embedding tests. Consider (11a)–(11c): 
 
(11) a.  If Lisa is French and therefore a citizen of the European Union, she can travel 
to Germany without a passport. 
 b.  If Lisa is French and so a citizen of the European Union, she can travel to 
Germany without a passport 
 c.  If Lisa is French and a citizen of the European Union, she can travel to 
Germany without a passport. 
 
In each case, the speaker is naturally understood as claiming that Lisa can travel to Germany 
without a passport on the following two conditions: (a) she is French and (b) she is a citizen 
of the European Union. The fact that (b) follows from (a) (together with background 
information) seems to have no more impact on the truth conditions of (11a)–(11c) than did 
the contrastive information carried by but in (9a)–(9b) above. In this case, so and therefore 
seems to be clearly non-truth-conditional. 
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With other examples, though, the standard embedding tests seem to show that so and 
therefore are clearly truth-conditional. Consider (12a)–(12c): 
 
(12) a. If the council fails to repair a pothole and you therefore break your leg, you 
should sue. 
 b. If the council fails to repair a pothole and so you break your leg, you should 
sue. 
 c. If the council fails to repair a pothole and you break your leg, you should sue. 
 
In each case, the speaker is naturally understood as encouraging the addressee to sue in the 
following three conditions: (a) the council fails to repair a pothole, (b) he breaks his leg, and 
(c) he broke his leg as a consequence of the council’s failure to repair the pothole.7 Intuitions 
are fairly clear in both (11) and (12), and an adequate account of therefore and so (and of 
similar connectives such as hence, thus and then) should shed light on why they sometimes 
seem to contribute to truth-conditional content and at other times not. I will suggest a possible 
procedural explanation later in the paper. In a framework that distinguishes use conditions 
from truth conditions, it might be more difficult to provide a unitary account, since some uses 
of these connectives would have to be dealt with in a ‘Theory of Meaning’ and others within 
a ‘Theory of Use’.  
 
Apart from some debate about its truth-conditional status, there is a further difference 
between use-conditional and procedural theorists in their analyses of but. Frege, Grice and 
most use-conditional theorists analyse P but Q as indicating that P and Q contrast in some 
way, whereas relevance theorists tend to follow the lead of Anscombre and Ducrot (1977:28), 
who treat the ‘denial of expectation’ use as basic and propose the following analysis:  
 
In P but Q, P implies not-R; Q implies R; Q has more weight.  
 
Alison Hall (2007:168), who surveys a wide range of analyses of but – some truth-
conditional and others non-truth-conditional, some conceptual and others procedural – ends 
by advocating a non-truth-conditional procedural account on which “but indicates that what 
follows is cutting off a line of inference opened up by the previous clause.” It is worth noting 
that whereas contrastive analyses of but seem to be fairly easily presentable in either 
procedural or use-conditional terms, it is harder to see what the use-conditional counterpart to 
Hall’s procedural analysis might be. How would the felicity conditions on the ‘denial of 
expectation’ use of but be formulated? For several reasons, then, but and other inferential 
connectives present a certain challenge to the use-conditional approach. 
 
3. What is procedural encoding? 
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As noted above, relevance theorists often describe procedural expressions as “instructing” the 
hearer to perform certain computations. Anne Bezuidenhout (2004) makes some suggestions 
about how this description should be understood. She considers two hypotheses. On the first, 
the “instructions” associated with a given procedural expression would be couched in a 
“proprietary code for representing semantic information” and realised as rules in the lexical 
entry for that expression specifying that if a certain condition is met, then a certain action 
must be performed. Comprehension would then proceed as follows: 
When the speaker-hearer accesses an item in the lexicon, he or she is able to access the 
information associated with that item, presumably in some sort of ‘look-up’ process that 
allows the entry for that item to be searched for relevant information. If the item encodes 
procedural information, the look-up process will access a rule. If the item encodes 
conceptual/descriptive information, the look-up process will access a concept. 
(Bezuidenhout 2004:7). 
 
Suppose, now, that the “proprietary code” in which the rules are couched is Mentalese (i.e. a 
conceptual representation system or ‘language of thought’), and that the actions specified by 
the rules involve manipulation of Mentalese representations. Then the result would be an 
infinite regress of the type made familiar by Dennett (1981) and Kripke (1982): 
If procedural rules are treated as items that are represented in Mentalese and as items that 
are listed in lexical entries (which in turn are simply lists of representations – data 
structures – that can be searched), then we face a form of the rule following paradox. 
Rules themselves will simply be more symbols along with the symbols they are meant to 
manipulate. But then it looks as though we’ll have to posit another set of rules for 
instructing us on how to use the original rules. Now, if these new rules are themselves 
items that are represented in Mentalese, the same problem arises all over again. Clearly 
we are off on an infinite regress here. (Bezuidenhout 2004:8) 
To stop the regress, we must assume that “at some point rules give way to procedures, where 
procedures are understood in some non-representational or non-symbolic way” 
(Bezuidenhout 2004:8).  
 
The second hypothesis Bezuidenhout considers, then, is that the procedures associated with 
non-truth-conditional expressions are of this non-representational, non-symbolic type. 
Bezuidenhout goes on to propose that these procedures should be analysed in dispositional 
terms, and seen as embodied in the causal architecture of the language production and 
comprehension system: that is, as part of the system of linguistic performance rather than 
linguistic competence. She concludes that whereas the conceptual information encoded by 
linguistic expressions is correctly described as semantic, procedural information of the type 
discussed by relevance theorists is better seen as pragmatic: 
The conceptual meanings that are associated with lexical items constitute an ideal 
speaker-hearer’s semantic competence, whereas the ability to use those concepts 
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constitutes the ideal speaker-hearer’s procedural knowledge, and this procedural 
knowledge is what drives language production and understanding (viz. linguistic 
performance)… The notion of a procedural unit is something that has a place in an 
account of language use, and hence it belongs to a theory of pragmatic performance and 
not to a theory of semantic competence. (Bezuidenhout 2004:13) 
Bezuidenhout is right to point out that the nature of the procedural information encoded by 
lexical items has been insufficiently addressed in relevance theory, and that these procedures 
must ultimately be seen as dispositional and analysed as part of the causal structure of the 
cognitive system. However, it does not seem to me to follow that procedural information of 
the type that relevance theorists have discussed is pragmatic rather than semantic, or that it 
differs in this respect from conceptual information. 
 
As noted above, the distinction between linguistic semantics and pragmatics is generally seen 
as coinciding with the distinction between decoding and inference (Ariel, 2010). To say that a 
particular expression in a public language (e.g. French) encodes a certain concept or 
procedure is to say that the internalised grammar and lexicon of that language interface with 
the rest of the cognitive system in such a way that activating that expression systematically 
activates the associated concept or procedure, and vice versa. On this approach, acquiring a 
public language involves setting up the interface between the linguistic system and the rest of 
the cognitive system in an appropriate way: so, for instance, learning a ‘content’ word such as 
scarlet or hop involves establishing a link between a new word and an available concept (or 
set of concepts), and acquiring an inferential connective such as but or so involves 
establishing a link between a new word and an available procedure (or set of procedures). 
Which word goes with which concept or procedure is an arbitrary matter that has to be 
learned in the course of acquiring a language, and therefore falls on the decoding side of the 
decoding-inference distinction. In that sense, the relation between a linguistic expression and 
the concept or procedure it encodes is properly regarded as semantic.  
 
On this approach, linguistic semantics is at the interface between the language system and the 
rest of the cognitive system, which is standardly seen as comprising a set of conceptual 
representations, on the one hand, and a set of procedures, on the other. In our book 
Relevance, Dan Sperber and I made some general comments on how semantic interpretation 
might be viewed in a cognitive system of this type: 
 
… a language is a set of semantically interpreted well-formed formulas. A formula is 
semantically interpreted by being put into systematic correspondence with other objects: 
for example, with the formulas of another language, with states of the user of the 
language, or with possible states of the world. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995:172-3) 
 
Here, “language” covers both public languages and the internalised conceptual representation 
system or ‘language of thought’, and a “formula” in a language is a constituent of that 
language (e.g. a word of French, or a concept in the ‘language of thought’). As noted in 
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Wilson (2011), it seems plausible to assume that all three types of systematic correspondence 
are exploited in linguistic communication, in the following way:  
 
(13) a.  Conceptual expressions in a public language (e.g. scarlet, hop) are 
systematically linked to concepts (e.g. SCARLET, HOP), which are constituents 
of a language of thought. 
  b.  Sentences in the language of thought (e.g. GIRAFFES HOP) are systematically 
linked to possible states of the world. 
  c.  Procedural expressions in natural language (e.g. but, so) are systematically 
linked to states of language users. 
 
The first two hypotheses are fairly standard: it is widely assumed that ‘content’ words get 
their meanings by encoding concepts, and that thoughts get their content by representing 
possible states of the world. The hypothesis I want to elaborate on is (13c), the idea that 
procedural expressions in a public language are semantically interpreted by being put into 
systematic correspondence with states of the language user.  
 
On many current approaches to cognitive science (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; 
Sperber, 2005; Carruthers, 2006; Mercier and Sperber, forthcoming), the human cognitive 
system is seen as comprising a large array of domain-specific inferential procedures with 
distinct developmental trajectories and breakdown patterns, which may be more or less 
highly activated in different circumstances and are likely to alter their level of activation in 
response to different cues. As Mercier and Sperber (2011:58) put it, 
 
An evolutionary approach suggests that inferential processes, rather than being based on 
a single inferential mechanism or constituting a single integrated system, are much more 
likely to be performed by a variety of domain-specific mechanisms, each attuned to the 
specific demands and affordances of its domain. 
 
Among the possible states of the user of a language will be those in which a certain 
inferential mechanism or procedure is highly activated. According to hypothesis (13c), the 
function of the procedural expressions in a language is to put the user of the language into a 
state in which some of these domain-specific inferential procedures are highly activated (and 
hence more likely to play a role in a relevance-oriented comprehension process). Thus, 
procedural expressions act as ‘pointers’ to certain procedures. 
 
As suggested in Wilson (2011), this hypothesis might help to explain certain differences in 
the behaviour of conceptual and procedural expressions that have been noticed in the 
literature. For instance, conceptual representations are often described as capable of being 
brought to consciousness, reflected on and used in general inference. If words such as scarlet 
or hop encode concepts, i.e. constituents of conceptual representations, this might help to 
explain the relative transparency of their relation to thoughts (Wilson and Sperber, 1993:16). 
By contrast, domain-specific cognitive procedures are generally seen as either purely 
dispositional or formulated in a sub-personal ‘machine language’ distinct from the language 
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of thought, which is relatively inaccessible to consciousness and resistant to 
conceptualisation. If the function of connectives such as but and so is to activate such 
procedures, this would help to explain why their meanings are relatively inaccessible to 
consciousness and are notoriously hard to pin down in conceptual terms (Wilson and Sperber 
1993:16).
8
 Moreover, the idea that acquisition of conceptual expressions depends on the 
availability of the associated concepts while acquisition of procedural expressions depends on 
the availability of the associated procedures may shed some light on subtle differences in the 
acquisition of grammaticalised vs. lexicalised expressions such as those discussed by Matsui 
and Miura (2009) and Matsui et al. (this issue). 
 
In this section, I have suggested that the function of procedural expressions is to activate 
domain-specific procedures which may be exploited in inferential communication. Standard 
relevance-theoretic accounts take a fairly restrictive view of the type of procedures involved. 
According to this standard view, the function of procedural expressions is to activate 
procedures whose main function is to help the hearer understand an utterance by finding the 
intended combination of context, explicit content and cognitive effects. In the light of recent 
‘massive modularity’ accounts on which both concepts and procedures are seen as evolving 
in response to different regularities in the environment, and therefore as heavily domain 
specific, it is worth considering whether procedural expressions may be used to activate 
cognitive procedures whose primary functions are not intrinsically linked to inferential 
comprehension. In a later section, I will discuss the possibility that languages typically 
contain clusters of procedural expressions linked to procedures or mechanisms from different 
cognitive domains. Here, I hope to have shown that it is worth distinguishing what is encoded 
from the nature of the encoding relation itself. Whereas the encoding relation is properly 
regarded as part of linguistic semantics, its outputs – whether concepts or procedures – are 
not. 
 
4. Interjections, procedural encoding and conventions for use 
Among the items that both procedural and use-conditional semanticists see as central to their 
concerns are interjections, discourse particles and mood indicators. In this section, I will 
make some comparisons between the types of analysis they propose, using interjections as an 
illustration. 
 
Kaplan (1999, 2004) suggests that instead of asking what an interjection means, we should 
ask what are the conditions under which it is “correctly”, “accurately” or “felicitously” used. 
He sees the meanings of interjections – and use conditions more generally – as a matter of 
convention, adding, “To the degree that such conditions reflect linguistic convention, the 
information that such a condition obtains is carried in the semantics of the expression” 
(Kaplan, 2004:3). He analyses two interjections – ouch and oops – in use-conditional terms. 
                                                 
8
 This is sometimes called the “descriptive ineffability” issue (Potts, 2007; Blakemore, 2011). 
Drozdzowicz (2015) argues, correctly in my view, that descriptive ineffability is merely a piece of 
evidence, and not a criterion for distinguishing conceptual from procedural meaning. 
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Here is his analysis for ouch (the quotation is taken from the transcript of a public lecture, 
hence the informal tone): 
 
I take it that the rule for ouch is reasonably simple: That the speaker has just experienced 
probably a sudden and sharp pain. I’m not going to worry too much about giving exact ... 
how precise the analysis is; I wanna get a rough cut at it. (Kaplan, 2004:10) 
 
On this approach, as he points out, ouch is informationally equivalent to the sentence I am in 
pain, and is “expressively correct” in all those contexts where the speaker is in pain. 
However, it lacks a truth value even in contexts where it is expressively correct, since it falls 
within the scope of a “Theory of Use” rather than a “Theory of Meaning”. 
 
As the above quotation makes clear, Kaplan’s aim is not to give a precise analysis of the full 
range of use conditions for ouch. He is aware that it can be appropriately used in ways that do 
not fit the proposed pattern, as in what he calls the “empathetic” use, where ouch is uttered in 
response to the perception of someone else in pain. He describes this as a “trope”, and hopes 
that it “need not be the concern of logic, which is grounded more in the literal use of 
language than in things like an empathetic use” (Kaplan, 2004:11). This raises the question of 
where the borderline between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ uses of interjections should be drawn, 
and how the ‘figurative’ uses are derived. For instance, ouch can be appropriately used when 
the pain is mental rather than physical, as in (14), from Wharton (2009:83): 
 
(14) a.  Dentist: That’ll be £75 for the consultation and £30 for the cavity. 
 b. Patient: Ouch! 
 
Depending on how pain is interpreted in the use conditions for ouch, this could be seen as 
either a literal use (where pain can be either mental or physical) or a metaphorical use 
(involving a broadening of the literal meaning of pain). There are also many further uses 
which do not fit Kaplan’s proposed pattern but do not seem obviously figurative either, as in 
(15): 
(15) a.  Every time I wake up with a hangover, ouch! I reach for an aspirin. 
 b. Last New Year’s Day I woke up with a hangover and ouch! I really felt it. 
 c. Tomorrow you’ll wake up with a hangover and ouch! you’ll really regret how 
much you drank tonight. 
 
An alternative account of ouch which would handle the full range of examples and fit well 
with the procedural analysis proposed by Tim Wharton (2003a, 2009, this issue) might start 
from the assumption that ouch is not informationally equivalent to I am in pain, but is used 
instead to communicate the speaker’s attitude or reaction to the experience, memory or 
prospect of pain (whether physical or mental). As Wharton notes, interjections are typically 
accompanied by affective intonation, which helps to calibrate the intensity of the reaction and 
the range and type of emotions or attitudes conveyed. However, affective intonation is not 
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generally considered properly linguistic, and to the limited extent that its use is governed by 
convention, the conventions are social rather than linguistic. This raises a question that 
Wharton discusses in some detail: are interjections properly linguistic, and do their uses 
reflect what Kaplan calls “linguistic convention” at all? 
 
Relevance-theoretic approaches to interjections have a very different flavour from Kaplan’s. 
Relevance theorists have been interested in whether they are properly linguistic (and whether 
only properly linguistic expressions can encode procedural information), whether the type of 
communication they involve is necessarily ostensive, to what extent they fall together with 
‘natural signals’ such as affective intonation or facial expressions of emotion, which are not 
themselves inherently ostensive, and so on (e.g. Wharton, 2003a, 2009, this issue; 
Walaszewska, 2004; Padilla Cruz, 2009). For instance, Wharton (2009:103) argues that the 
meanings of interjections are “partly natural and partly coded”, and that they fall “at various 
points along a continuum between display and language proper”. In his view, interjections are 
not in general a part of language, although their partly coded nature means that they might be 
seen as “existing on the edge of language, integrated to a greater or lesser extent”. This brings 
out their similarities to intonation, which is also widely seen as existing on a continuum 
between the natural and the properly linguistic (e.g. Pell, 2002, 2006; Gussenhoven, 2004; 
Wilson and Wharton, 2006). 
 
If interjections turn out to be not properly linguistic, the consequences for procedural 
semantics and use-conditional semantics would be rather different. As pointed out in section 
3, the inferential procedures discussed in procedural semantics are not themselves properly 
linguistic, and it is quite reasonable to suppose that they may be triggered by non-linguistic as 
well as linguistic cues. For instance, ‘natural signals’ such as affective intonation and facial 
expressions of emotion are often seen as governed by ‘natural codes’ of the type involved in 
animal communication systems such as the bee dance (Wharton, 2003b, 2009; Scott-Phillips, 
2015). In a procedural approach to semantics, these ‘natural codes’ should be 
straightforwardly analysable in procedural terms, as involving systematic correspondences 
between ‘natural signals’ and states of the user or perceiver. In this framework, procedural 
analyses should be equally applicable to public language expressions, interjections (whether 
properly linguistic or not), and ‘natural signals’ such as affective intonation and facial 
expressions of emotion, which are not inherently ostensive. By contrast, the claim that 
affective intonation and facial expressions of emotion can be explained in terms of something 
comparable to linguistic conventions seems far-fetched at best. Here, the differences between 
approaches based on an extension of semantics and those linked to a theory of 
communication such as relevance theory seem quite clear. 
 
5. Lexical pragmatics and the conceptual–procedural distinction 
The development of the conceptual–procedural distinction within relevance theory was 
influenced by the work of Oswald Ducrot and his colleagues, who were pursuing the idea that 
many or most expressions in a language have not only conceptual content but also an 
inferential or argumentative orientation, which in relevance theory would be analysed in 
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procedural terms (Ducrot, 1972, 1980; Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983). Although 
commentators on relevance theory sometimes assume that the conceptual–procedural 
distinction was intended to be mutually exclusive, so that a single word cannot encode both 
types of meaning, there are several reasons for thinking that conceptual and procedural 
information may combine in the semantics of a single expression. 
 
To take just one example, Ducrot (1972) analyses the French equivalents of pairs such as few 
and a few in utterances like the following: 
 
(16) a.  Pierre had few drinks: he was quite abstemious. 
 b.  ?Pierre had a few drinks: he was quite abstemious. 
(17) a.  ?Pierre had few drinks: he got drunk quite early. 
 b.  Pierre had a few drinks: he got drunk quite early.  
 
Here, few and a few carry similar information about quantity, which affects the truth 
conditions of utterances and is plausibly treated as conceptual. However, they also impose 
what Ducrot and colleagues call an “argumentative orientation”, which accounts for the 
differences in acceptability illustrated in (16)–(17). Describing Pierre as having had few 
drinks orients the hearer towards the conclusion that he was quite abstemious, whereas 
describing him as having a few drinks orients the hearer in the opposite direction. This seems 
to be a fact about the semantics of few vs. a few, which must be acquired in the course of 
learning the language. Thus, few and a few (and comparable pairs such as little / a little, 
almost / barely and so on) provide some evidence that conceptual and procedural meaning 
can combine in the analysis of a single word. 
 
Other candidates for mixed conceptual-procedural analysis include some items of particular 
interest to use-conditional theorists: ethnic slurs such as Kraut, which shares its denotation 
with German but carries an additional expressive element, and a range of further items which 
share their denotations but differ in the attitudes or evaluations they convey, e.g. dog vs cur, 
violin vs fiddle, horse vs steed, and so on (Potts, 2007; Blakemore 2011, 2015; Gutzmann, 
2015; Wharton, this issue). Use-conditional semantics should be particularly valuable in 
examining the contribution of these hybrid expressions to the interpretation of utterances as a 
whole. 
 
The idea that a single word can encode both conceptual and procedural information might be 
extended in several ways. In fact, Ducrot ended up proposing that all ‘content’ words may 
carry procedural information, and there has been some debate in relevance theory about this 
suggestion. In a discussion on the relevance e-mail list (Relevance e-mail Archives, 
3.12.2007), Dan Sperber commented that it “would not be inconsistent” for relevance 
theorists to adopt Ducrot’s proposal, or at least to adapt it along the following lines: 
(18) a.  Assume that all lexical items encode procedures (whether or not they also 
encode conceptual content, as most of them do). 
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b.  When conceptual information is encoded, so is an instruction to inferentially 
construct an ad hoc concept using the encoded conceptual content as a starting 
point. 
c. Other instructions of the type familiar from Diane Blakemore’s work may be 
encoded by any word, whether or not it also encodes conceptual content. 
 
On this approach, most words would encode some procedural content. Some would also 
encode conceptual content, whereas others (e.g. however) would not. Among words that 
encode both procedural and conceptual content, some (e.g. hop) would automatically trigger 
a procedure for constructing an ad hoc concept on the basis of the encoded concept,
9
 whereas 
others (e.g. unless) might encode a more specific procedure of the type discussed in sections 
2–4 above. 
  
Although the idea that all lexical items might encode procedural information is quite 
speculative, it does seem to offer some advantages that make it worth taking seriously. In the 
first place, it would shed light on a claim often made in relevance theory, that the occurrence 
of a word in an utterance is a ‘pointer to’, or a ‘piece of evidence about’, the speaker’s 
meaning, as in the following comment from Sperber and Wilson (1998:196):  
 
Quite generally, the occurrence of a word in an utterance provides a piece of evidence, a 
pointer to a concept involved in the speaker's meaning. It may so happen that the 
intended concept is the very one encoded by the word, which is therefore used in its 
strictly literal sense. However, we would argue that this is no more than a possibility, not 
a preferred or default interpretation. 
 
It would be interesting to compare this idea with another hypothesis currently being 
considered in the literature, that many words encode ‘pro-concepts’, which are semantically 
incomplete and have to be fleshed out into full concepts using available contextual 
information. Discussing this hypothesis, Sperber and Wilson (1998:185) comment, 
 
We believe that pro-concepts are quite common, but the argument of this chapter does 
not depend on that assumption (or even on the existence of pro-concepts). What we will 
argue is that, quite commonly, all words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts: that is, 
whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the concept it is used to convey in a given 
utterance has to be contextually worked out. 
 
The idea that most ‘content’ words encode not only a concept but also a procedure for ad hoc 
concept construction suggests one way of implementing this proposal (for discussion, see 
Carston, 2012, 2013, this issue). 
                                                 
9
 Relevance theorists have argued for some time that the interpretation of every ‘content’ word is fine-
tuned in context (Wilson and Carston, 2007; Sperber and Wilson, 2008; Jodlowiec, 2015; 
Walaszewska, 2015). The suggestion in (18b) is that the processing of a ‘content’ word might 
automatically activate such a fine-tuning procedure. 
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The same idea might shed some light on historical processes such as grammaticalization, 
where a lexical item gradually loses some or all of its conceptual content and acquires a 
purely grammatical function (Traugott and Heine, 1991; Hopper and Traugott, 2003). For 
instance, König and Traugott (1982:172) provide evidence that still was used in Old English 
only as an adjective or adverb with the meaning ‘still, quietly’; the adverb still developed a 
temporal sense in Middle English and a purely concessive use in Early Modern English The 
tendency of temporal connectives such as since, as, while, still and then to give rise to purely 
inferential uses has been observed in many languages, and various pragmatic explanations 
have been proposed. In a framework where much of the conceptual vocabulary is seen as 
entirely lacking in procedural content, the historical process by which an adverb such as still 
or a noun such as while gives rise to a temporal and then a ppurely inferential connective 
must be seen as involving a switch at some point from conceptual to procedural status. The 
framework offers no obvious way of explaining why such a switch should take place, or why 
it typically goes in one direction (i.e. from conceptual to procedural) rather than the other. In 
a framework where all ‘content’ words would start out with at least some procedural content, 
it is easy to see how more specific procedures might be added over time, to a point where the 
original conceptual content becomes entirely redundant (these points are insightfully 
discussed in Nicolle, 1998; Breul, 2007; Clark, this isssue). 
 
I have tried to show in this section that the assumption that some expressions encode both 
conceptual and procedural meaning has definite advantages for lexical pragmatics. I have 
also tentatively suggested that the assumption that all conceptual expressions encode 
procedural meaning might bring further advantages, and is worth investigating further. In the 
next section, I will look more closely at the relation between argumentative orientation and 
procedural meaning, and discuss some further possible revisions or extensions. Before 
moving on, though, it is worth pointing out that the type of procedural information discussed 
in this section would be extremely hard to translate into conditions on appropriate use of the 
type that Kaplan and his colleagues have discussed. As noted above, Kaplan sees semantics 
as concerned with conditions on literal use, whereas the type of procedural information 
described in (18a)–(18b) constrains the pragmatic process of lexical modulation, which 
accounts for narrowed, approximate, hyperbolic and metaphorical uses, and therefore crosses 
the ‘literal-figurative’ divide. This is not the sort of information that could be captured in a 
strictly linguistic or semantic convention, and in this case, use-conditional semantics and 
procedural semantics again come apart. 
 
6. Massive modularity and the conceptual–procedural distinction 
A massively modular mind is characterised by a wide array of special-purpose cognitive 
mechanisms or modules adapted to regularities in different domains. In section 3, I suggested 
that the function of procedural expressions may be to activate such domain-specific 
procedures, which are likely to be drawn from modules (or sub-modules) which play a 
significant role in linguistic communication: for instance, those involved in mindreading, 
emotion reading, social cognition, parsing and speech production and inferential 
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comprehension. One consequence of this suggestion is that we might expect to find clusters 
of procedural items linked to different domain-specific capacities. And indeed, this seems to 
be just what we find. 
 
For instance, most languages have a cluster of procedural items (e.g. affective intonation, 
interjections, attitudinal particles) associated with domain-specific mechanisms for emotion 
reading. Most languages also have a cluster of procedural items (e.g. mood indicators, which 
may be realised by grammaticalised particles or morphemes, by word order or simply by 
intonation) associated with domain-specific mechanisms for attributing mental states on the 
basis of behavioural cues. Languages with grammaticalised honorific systems contain a 
further cluster of procedural expressions which might be seen as linked to domain-specific 
mechanisms for social cognition. Notice that the capacities for mindreading, emotion reading 
and social cognition are not intrinsically linked to ostensive communication: for instance, we 
attribute mental or emotional states to others whether or not they are communicating with us.  
 
Two further capacities that have received considerable attention in recent years are those for 
argumentation and epistemic vigilance. The argumentative capacity involves “a mechanism 
for representing possible reasons to accept a conclusion … and for evaluating their strength” 
(Mercier and Sperber, 2011:58). It is important to distinguish arguments from inferences, or 
inferential procedures, of the type discussed by Blakemore (1987, 2002). As Mercier and 
Sperber put it, 
 
An inference is a process the output of which is a representation. An argument is a 
complex representation. Both an inference and an argument have what can be called a 
conclusion, but in the case of an inference, the conclusion is the output of the inference; 
in the case of an argument, the conclusion is a part – typically the last part – of the 
representation. (Mercier and Sperber, 2011: 58). 
 
That is, inferences are procedural, while arguments are representational.  
 
The capacity for epistemic vigilance involves “a suite of cognitive mechanisms … targeted at 
the risk of being misinformed by others” (Sperber et al., 2010:359). Whereas the 
argumentative capacity is of benefit to both speakers and hearers, epistemic vigilance is 
primarily of benefit to hearers, who are seen as possessing domain-specific mechanisms 
geared to evaluating the reliability of the communicator, on the one hand, and the 
communicated information, on the other. 
 
Suppose, now, that I want you to believe a certain proposition although I know it conflicts 
with some background assumption you have in mind. One way to persuade you would be to 
produce an argument showing that this proposition follows logically from, or is strongly 
supported by, other background information you have available that you would be reluctant 
to give up. Producing an argument of this type would involve the use of logical or inferential 
connectives to display the intended logical or evidential relations. As Sperber (2001:410) puts 
it, 
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Displaying [logical/evidential relations] requires an argumentative form, the use of 
logical terms such as if, and, or and unless, and of words indicating inferential 
relationships such as therefore, since, but, and nevertheless. It is generally taken for 
granted that the logical and inferential vocabulary is – and presumably emerged as – a 
tool for reflection and reasoning. From an evolutionary point of view, this is not 
particularly plausible. The hypothesis that such terms emerged as tools for persuasion 
may be easier to defend. 
 
This sheds new light on the standard relevance-theoretic account of inferential connectives 
such as but and so, on which their main function is to activate procedures which guide the 
hearer’s path in inferential comprehension. It suggests, in fact, that these inferential 
connectives might contribute to comprehension in two rather different ways. On the one 
hand, the inferential relationships they indicate may remain in the background of the 
comprehension process, so that the addressee simply draws the appropriate conclusions 
without thinking about the reasons for drawing them. In that case, the connectives would 
contribute to relevance mainly on the effort-saving side, by narrowing the search space for 
appropriate contextual assumptions and cognitive effects, and this is how they have generally 
been seen in relevance theory. On the other hand, the existence of the inferential relationships 
indicated by these connectives may be relevant enough in its own right to be worth the 
addressee’s attention, so that he not only draws the appropriate conclusions but thinks about 
the reasons for drawing them, and goes on to derive further conclusions that would not 
otherwise have been derived. In that case, the connectives might contribute to relevance not 
only by saving effort but by contributing new effects. I will return to this point in section 7. 
 
As noted above, the capacity for epistemic vigilance is primarily of benefit to hearers, and 
involves a suite of mechanisms geared to assessing not only the strength and validity of 
arguments, but also the reliability, honesty and trustworthiness of the speaker. It is in the 
interest of speakers to appear generally reliable, honest and trustworthy. If we regularly 
interact with the same people, giving them false or inaccurate information (even if it is to our 
own immediate advantage) may damage our reputation and end up being costly in the long 
run. Conversely, doing our best to be systematically trustworthy may cost us some immediate 
benefit, but may be beneficial in the long run. The trade-off between the short term costs and 
long term benefits of a policy of trustworthiness may vary from person to person, so that 
different speakers may end up following different policies. However, speakers who opt for a 
policy of systematic trustworthiness would stand to benefit from a reputation for being highly 
trustworthy, which would be fed by common knowledge of their past actions, and might be 
advertised by their everyday public behaviour and demeanour. 
 
Suppose, now, that I want you to believe some proposition, but I am not sure you will take 
my word for it in the absence of any information about the type of evidence I have available 
or my reliability on that topic. An obvious way to persuade you would be to display openly 
the type of evidence I have, or my degree of confidence in the truth of my assertion, by using 
linguistic indicators of epistemic modality or evidentiality (Aikhenvald, 2004; Fitneva and 
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Matsui, 2009). Seen in this light, the function of evidentials and epistemic modals would be 
not so much to guide the comprehension process (since the proposition expressed by the 
utterance would have been understood just as well without them) as to display the 
communicator’s competence, benevolence and trustworthiness to the hearer. 
 
Some support for this suggestion comes from comments by speakers of languages with 
grammaticalised evidential systems in which the use of evidentials is obligatory. According 
to Alexandra Aikhenvald (2004:336), in languages of this type, “getting one’s evidentials 
right is important for one’s status and credibility”: 
 
Ignoring evidentiality in a language with evidentials gets you marked as unreliable or a 
liar. (Aikhenvald, 2004:344) 
 
Accuracy in getting one’s information source right is crucial for successful 
communication, and for the speaker’s reputation. (ibid.:335) 
 
Or, as Silver and Miller (1997: 37) put it,  
 
In the use of evidentials, the issue is not morality, or truth, it is accuracy.  
 
These comments suggest that evidentials have more to do with getting the addressee to trust 
the speaker than with helping him to understand her, and this idea would be worth exploring 
further. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
As I have presented it in this paper, the cognitive distinction between conceptual and 
procedural information cross-cuts the distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-
conditional meaning, and is in some ways more fundamental. In this framework, the primary 
bearers of truth-conditional content are not utterances or speech acts but conceptual 
representations, and intuitions about the truth-conditional content of utterances or speech acts 
are often bound up with pragmatic inferences about which of the many propositions an 
utterance makes manifest is the one on which its main relevance depends. These intuitions 
have played a significant role in debates about the truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional 
status of appositives, parentheticals and inferential connectives, and in distinguishing basic 
explicatures from higher-order explicatures in utterances such as (19), where the main 
relevance may depend on either the proposition that I’m leaving or the proposition that I’m 
telling you I’m leaving (Wilson, 2000; Ifantidou, 2001; Iten, 2005): 
 
(19) I tell you I’m leaving. 
 
Although use-conditional theorists are mainly concerned with the distinction between truth-
conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning, it is fairly easy to see how the notion of 
conceptual meaning might fit with their framework, and by far the biggest differences 
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between use-conditional and procedural semantics fall on the expressive/ procedural side. 
Formal semanticists in general tend to appeal to representations rather than processes: thus, 
attempts to incorporate Grice’s notion of conventional implicature into formal semantics have 
treated it (as he seems to have done himself) in conceptual rather than procedural terms (e.g. 
as contributing to some other level of conceptual information than “at issue” content, cf. 
Potts, 2005). Blakemore’s reanalysis of conventional implicatures in procedural terms was 
genuinely original. I have tried to show that in many cases, procedural analyses are neither 
equivalent to nor translatable into use-conditional analyses à la Kaplan, and that the two 
approaches to semantics are genuinely distinct. So far in relevance theory, the null hypothesis 
has been that words encode concepts, and only if conceptual analysis proves impossible or 
unwieldy would a procedural analysis be considered. But from the perspective of a theory of 
ostensive communication, where a public language is just one tool among many for getting 
the speaker’s meaning across, we might reasonably expect languages to contain all sorts of 
devices which merely point the addressee in the right direction rather than providing a full 
concept as a starting point for inference. The suggestion that procedures may be triggered by 
non-linguistic cues, and that all linguistic expressions might be procedural to some extent, is 
a step in this direction. 
 
Let us return, finally, to the status of so and therefore, which as illustrated in (11) and (12) 
(repeated here) seem sometimes to affect truth-conditional content and at other times not: 
 
(11) a.  If Lisa is French and therefore a citizen of the European Union, she can travel 
to Germany without a passport. 
 b. If Lisa is French and so a citizen of the European Union, she can travel to 
Germany without a passport. 
 c.  If Lisa is French and a citizen of the European Union, she can travel to 
Germany without a passport. 
(12) a. If the council fails to repair a pothole and you therefore break your leg, you 
should sue. 
 b. If the council fails to repair a pothole and so you break your leg, you should 
sue. 
 c. If the council fails to repair a pothole and you break your leg, you should sue. 
 
I suggested that in (11a)–(11b), there is a clear intuition that therefore and so do not affect the 
truth conditions of the utterance (i.e. they do not fall within the scope of if), while in (12a)–
(12b), there is a clear intuition that they do. Does this mean we have to resort to an ambiguity 
account on which so and therefore have two distinct senses, one conceptual and truth-
conditional and the other procedural and non-truth-conditional? Before moving in that 
direction, it is worth reflecting on the two ways in which an inferential connective may 
contribute to relevance, as discussed in section 6 above. In (11a)–(11b), the use of so and 
therefore indicates that there is an inferential relationship between being French and being a 
citizen of the European Union, a fact which might already have been manifest to the 
addressee of (11c) in the absence of any connective. Similarly, in (12a)–(12b), the use of so 
and therefore indicates that there is an inferential relationship between the council’s failing to 
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repair a pothole and the addressee’s breaking his leg, a possibility which might already have 
been manifest to the addressee of (12c) in the absence of any connective. The difference 
between (11) and (12) is that in (11a)–(11c), the inferential relationship indicated by the use 
of the connectives remains in the background and the contribution of the connectives to 
relevance is mainly on the effort-saving side, whereas in (12a)–(12c), the inferential 
relationship indicated by the use of the connectives is relevant enough in its own right to be 
worth the hearer’s attention, and as shown by (12c), must be inferred even in the absence of 
the connectives in order to satisfy the addressee’s expectations of relevance. On this 
approach, the truth-conditional status of so and therefore is like the truth-conditional status of 
I tell you in (19): intuitions about their contributions to truth-conditional content are bound up 
with intuitions about where the main relevance of the utterance lies. 
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